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The Role of Prevention Focus Under Stereotype Threat:
Initial Cognitive Mobilization Is Followed by Depletion
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Previous research has demonstrated that stereotype threat induces a prevention focus and impairs central
executive functions. The present research examines how these 2 consequences of stereotype threat are
related. The authors argue that the prevention focus is responsible for the effects of stereotype threat on
executive functions and cognitive performance. However, because the prevention focus is adapted to deal
with threatening situations, the authors propose that it also leads to some beneficial responses to
stereotype threat. Specifically, because stereotype threat signals a high risk of failure, a prevention focus
initiates immediate recruitment of cognitive control resources. The authors further argue that this
response initially facilitates cognitive performance but that the additional cognitive demands associated
with working under threat lead to cognitive depletion over time. Study 1 demonstrates that stereotype
threat (vs. control) facilitates immediate cognitive control capacity during a stereotype-relevant task.
Study 2 experimentally demonstrates the process by showing that stereotype threat (vs. control) facilitates
cognitive control as a default, as well as when a prevention focus has been experimentally induced, but
not when a promotion focus has been induced. Study 3 shows that stereotype threat facilitates initial math
performance under a prevention focus, whereas no effect is found under a promotion focus. Consistent
with previous research, however, stereotype threat impaired math performance over time under a
prevention focus, but not under a promotion focus.
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Members of stigmatized groups frequently find themselves in
situations in which negative stereotypes suggest that their group’s
performance capacity is limited. As shown in the literature review
below, there is by now considerable evidence that such stereotype
threats impair cognitive performance. Recently, research in this
area has focused on identifying the elusive process(es) that account
for this phenomenon. One explanation suggests that stereotype
threat impairs cognitive performance because it taxes the individ-
ual’s cognitive control capacity (Schmader & Johns, 2003;
Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008; cf. Beilock, Jellison, Rydell,
McConnell, & Carr, 2006). Another explanation put forth is that
stereotype threat initiates defensive self-regulatory strategies (a
prevention focus) that are unsuitable for the type of tasks in which
most stereotype threat effects have been obtained (Seibt & Förster,
2004).
Rather than offering alternative accounts of the stereotype threat
phenomenon, we argue in the present article that these explana-
tions are closely connected. Specifically, we propose that individ-
uals generally respond to stereotype threat by adopting a preven-
tion focus, which in turn leads to immediate recruitment of
additional cognitive control resources in an attempt to avoid fail-
ure. We further argue that this response is adaptive to tackle instant
threats but that the additional cognitive demands associated with
working under threat eventually should deplete the individual’s
limited cognitive control resources. We therefore expect that ste-
reotype threat should lead to initial benefits for cognitive control
and performance on demanding cognitive tasks. Over time, how-
ever, stereotype threat should lead to cognitive control impair-
ments. Finally, because both of these consequences of stereotype
threat are attributable to the operation of the prevention focus,
stereotype threat should have little effect on cognitive control and
performance under a promotion focus. Before we outline the
theoretical and empirical foundation for this line of reasoning, we
review the literature on how stereotype threat affects cognitive
performance as well as evidence linking stereotype threat to
prevention-oriented self-regulation.
Stereotype Threat and Cognitive Performance
Ever since the path-breaking work by Steele and Aronson
(1995), evidence has accumulated confirming the idea that nega-
tive stereotypes about the ability of one’s group can impair per-
formance in stereotype-relevant domains (e.g., Aronson, Lustina,
Good, & Keough, 1999; Beilock et al., 2006; Croizet & Claire,
1998; Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2000; Levy, 1996; Leyens, De´sert,
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Croizet, & Darcis, 2000; Marx & Goff, 2005; Schmader & Johns,
2003; Spencer, Steele & Quinn, 1999; Steele, 1997; Steele &
Aronson, 1995; Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999). How
subtly such stereotype threat effects can be produced was illus-
trated in a study by Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev (2000) in which it was
shown that women’s performance on a math test can be negatively
affected by the mere presence of men in the room.
After the robustness of stereotype threat effects had been estab-
lished, research focused on identifying the processes through
which stereotype threat impairs performance. Initially, attention
was primarily directed toward the role of anxiety. For example,
Steele and Aronson (1995) argued that stereotype threat induces
anxiety and self-doubt and that these states may eventually inter-
fere with task performance (Steele & Aronson, 1995). Initially, this
idea received mixed support. Whereas some studies found that
anxiety and negative task-related thoughts were related to perfor-
mance impairments under threat (Bosson, Haymovitz, & Pinel,
2004; Cadinu, Maass, Rosabianca, & Kiesner, 2005; Ford, Fergu-
son, Brooks, & Hagadone, 2004), other studies failed to find such
a link (Aronson et al., 1999; Spencer et al., 1999; Steele &
Aronson, 1995; Stone et al., 1999).
Recently, several researchers have proposed that anxiety and
stereotype-related concerns may have a more indirect effect on
task performance by influencing executive functioning (Schmader
& Johns, 2003; Schmader et al., 2008; cf. Beilock et al., 2006).
Schmader and Johns (2003) argued that stereotype threat brings
additional demands to the test situation (e.g., anxiety, stereotype-
related thoughts) that tax limited working memory resources
needed to solve complicated problems. In support of this notion,
they demonstrated that stereotype threat reduced working memory
capacity, which in turn mediated the effect of stereotype threat on
math performance (Schmader & Johns, 2003; cf. Beilock, Rydell,
& McConnell, 2007). Follow-up studies have demonstrated that
attempts to regulate one’s level of anxiety indeed contribute to the
depletion of working memory resources under stereotype threat
(Johns, Inzlicht, & Schmader, 2008). In addition, there is evidence
suggesting that stereotype threat not only taxes working memory
but also impairs the ability to regulate thoughts, emotions, and
behavior more generally. For example, stereotype threat has been
found to impair the ability to inhibit pre-potent responses in the
Stroop color-naming task as well as physical endurance on a
handgrip task (Inzlicht, McKay, & Aronson, 2006; Johns et al.,
2008). As a consequence, stereotype threat effects can also spill
over and negatively affect performance in domains unrelated to the
stereotype, provided that performance in the unrelated domain
relies on cognitive control (Carr & Steele, 2010; Inzlicht & Kang,
2010). Meanwhile, other researchers have suggested that the ste-
reotype threat phenomenon is a consequence of the self-regulatory
strategies that people adopt in response to stereotype threat, a
notion to which we turn next.
The Role of Prevention Focus
According to regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997), there are
two distinct self-regulatory orientations that people may adopt in
goal pursuit: a promotion focus or a prevention focus. When
people are in a promotion focus, they are concerned with their
ideals and nurturance needs. This focus results in a general sensi-
tivity to the presence versus absence of positive outcomes and is
associated with eager, explorative approach-oriented information-
processing strategies aimed at reaching a positive end state. A
promotion focus has also been linked to a global (vs. local)
perception style (Förster & Higgins, 2005) and to creative thinking
(Friedman & Förster, 2001, 2002, 2005a). By contrast, people in a
prevention focus are concerned with thoughts and safety needs.
This focus results in a general sensitivity to the presence versus
absence of negative outcomes and is associated with vigilant,
risk-aversive avoidance-oriented information-processing strategies
aimed at precluding a negative end state. A prevention focus has
also been linked to a local (vs. global) perception style (Förster &
Higgins, 2005) and to analytical thinking (Seibt & Förster, 2004).
Seibt and Förster (2004) noted that stereotype threat effects have
predominantly been demonstrated on tasks that require a flexible
information-processing style and the ability to shift mental sets,
such as tests of general intelligence, scholastic ability, or mathe-
matical ability. They further argued that the risk-aversive strategies
preferred by individuals in a prevention focus should be highly
unsuitable for such tasks. However, because the activation of a
negative stereotype makes the risk of failure salient, this should
lead to the adoption of a minimal goal of avoiding failure (a
prevention goal) rather than a maximal goal of achieving success
(a promotion goal). They therefore proposed that stereotype threat
may impair cognitive test performance in part because it induces a
prevention focus. Consistent with this line of reasoning, Seibt and
Förster (2004) found that the activation of a negative stereotype
leads to better recall for avoidance- (vs. approach-) related state-
ments, the adoption of cautious (vs. risky) strategies in goal
pursuit, as well as to reduced creativity (but improved analytical
thinking). More recent studies have confirmed that the activation
of negative stereotypes indeed impairs performance on complex
cognitive tasks (e.g., a math task) under a prevention focus, but not
under a promotion focus (Keller & Bless, 2008).
Regulatory focus theory thus seems to offer a parsimonious
account for why stereotype threat impairs performance on de-
manding cognitive tasks that require a flexible style of information
processing. At first glance, however, regulatory focus theory
seems less apt to explain why stereotype threat impairs cognitive
control and the ability to regulate one’s thoughts, feelings, and
behavior more generally (Inzlicht & Kang, 2010; Inzlicht et al.,
2006; Johns et al., 2008). After all, the ability to regulate one’s
behavior is required for successful prevention-oriented as well as
promotion-oriented goal pursuit. Indeed, studies that have exam-
ined how different self-regulatory orientations affect executive
functions have produced mixed results. Whereas some studies
have found that an approach- (vs. avoidance-) oriented state is
beneficial for cognitive control (Friedman & Förster, 2005b), other
studies have obtained the opposite pattern of results (Koch, Hol-
land, & van Knippenberg, 2008; Koch, Holland, Hengstler, & van
Knippenberg, 2009). To resolve this issue, we argue that it is
necessary to examine how a prevention (vs. promotion) focus
affects cognitive control depending on the situational circum-
stances. We propose that a prevention focus (but not a promotion
focus) causes the individual to recruit additional cognitive control
resources under stereotype threat, because it signals a risk of
imminent failure. Although adaptive to tackle an immediate threat,
and beneficial for cognitive performance in the short run, exposure
to a threatening environment should eventually lead to cognitive
impairments under a prevention focus.
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Initial Cognitive Mobilization in Response to
Stereotype Threat
When individuals are under a promotion focus, they are moti-
vated to pursue important goals primarily when they expect to
succeed (Shah & Higgins, 1997; Zaal, van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, &
Derks, 2011). By contrast, when individuals are under a prevention
focus, they perceive it as a necessity to pursue important goals, and
particularly when there is a high risk of failure (Shah & Higgins,
1997; Zaal et al., 2011). Because stereotype threat induces a
prevention focus (Seibt & Förster, 2004) and makes the risk of
failure highly salient (Steele & Aronson, 1995), it should make
individuals particularly engaged in the task at hand. Furthermore,
because prevention goals are construed as necessities, individuals
are inclined to engage in goal pursuit at an earlier stage under a
prevention focus than under a promotion focus (Freitas, Liberman,
Salovey, & Higgins, 2002). This inclination, we argue, should be
particularly pronounced when under stereotype threat, because the
risk of failure is highly salient.
Thus, we propose that stereotype threat induces a prevention
focus (Seibt & Förster, 2004), which initiates immediate recruit-
ment of cognitive control resources in response to the salient risk
of failure. In the short run, stereotype threat should therefore
facilitate cognitive control. However, the stereotype threat litera-
ture suggests that managing and suppressing stereotype-relevant
thoughts and feelings should eventually lead to cognitive exhaus-
tion (e.g., Johns et al., 2008; Logel, Iserman, Davies, Quinn, &
Spencer, 2009; Schmader & Johns, 2003; cf. Baumeister, Brat-
lavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). As
a consequence, we expect stereotype threat to lead to immediate
self-regulatory benefits, but to self-regulatory impairments over
time. By contrast, stereotype threat should have little effect on
recruitment of cognitive control resources when under a promotion
focus, because task engagement is relatively insensitive to the risk
of failure when the individual is in this self-regulatory state. As a
consequence, individuals who experience stereotype threat under a
promotion focus should not show any immediate self-regulatory
benefits. However, due to their relative insensitivity to the risk of
failure, they should also spend fewer cognitive resources attempt-
ing to regulate or suppress stereotype-relevant thoughts and feel-
ings. Therefore, we do not expect individuals to succumb to
stereotype threat effects over time under a promotion focus (cf.
Keller & Bless, 2008).
As mentioned earlier, Inzlicht and colleagues (2006) as well as
Johns and colleagues (2008) have examined how stereotype threat
affects domain-general measures of cognitive control (e.g., Stroop
performance). The findings from these studies suggested that ste-
reotype threat had a negative effect on cognitive control. However,
the cognitive control measure was presented as an unrelated pilot
test in these studies, and cognitive control was assessed before the
critical stereotype-relevant test. As a consequence, these studies do
not speak to the present prediction that stereotype threat should
facilitate immediate control while working under threat. Rather,
the findings from these earlier studies may indicate that threatened
individuals conserved their energy during the pilot test in prepa-
ration for the subsequent critical test. By contrast, we use the
cognitive control task itself as the stereotype-relevant test in the
present research. That way, we are able to examine how stereotype
threat affects cognitive control while working on the stereotype-
relevant test.
There are also studies suggesting that taking a test under ste-
reotype threat leads to impairments in cognitive control capacity
after the test (Carr & Steele, 2010; Inzlicht & Kang, 2010). Again,
such findings do not reveal how stereotype threat affects cognitive
control during the stereotype-relevant test. However, observations
that cognitive control is impaired after the stereotype-relevant test
seems consistent with our line of reasoning that working under
stereotype threat should deplete the limited cognitive control re-
source over time. We test this implication of the resource recruit-
ment hypothesis directly in the present research.
It is important to note that we are not suggesting that stereotype
threat is beneficial for cognitive performance across the board.
Indeed, the existing literature clearly demonstrates that stereotype
threat generally impairs cognitive performance. However, as has
been pointed out by several researchers, multiple processes con-
tribute to stereotype threat effects on cognitive performance (e.g.,
Schmader et al., 2008; Seibt & Förster, 2004). For example,
stereotype threat can cause the individual to select more careful
strategies (Seibt & Förster, 2004), facilitate analytical thinking at
the expense of creativity and flexibility (Carr & Steele, 2009; Seibt
& Förster, 2004), and lead to a physiological stress response
(Blascovich, Spencer, Quinn, & Steele, 2001; Murphy, Steele, &
Gross, 2007). What we are suggesting in the present article is that
stereotype threat also leads to immediate recruitment of cognitive
control resources. We further argue that this adaptive response is
attributable to the adoption of a prevention focus and that it
facilitates coping with the threat in the short run.
Overview of the Present Research
We conducted three studies to test whether individuals recruit
additional cognitive control resources in response to stereotype
threat and whether this effect is attributable to the prevention
focus. On the basis of Seibt and Förster’s (2004) findings that
stereotype threat generally induces a prevention focus, we inves-
tigated in Study 1 whether stereotype threat (vs. control) improved
immediate cognitive control capacity as a default. In the second
study, we expanded our analysis by examining whether this effect
is indeed caused by the prevention focus. Specifically, we inves-
tigated whether the positive effect of stereotype threat (vs. control)
on immediate cognitive control generalized to a situation in which
a prevention focus had been experimentally induced, but disap-
peared when a promotion focus had been induced. In both of these
studies, we measured cognitive control capacity with a Stroop task.
The Stroop task was particularly suitable for the present purposes
because Stroop performance is regarded as a domain-general cog-
nitive control measure (e.g., Kane & Engle, 2003). A second
reason to focus on Stroop performance was to make the findings as
comparable as possible with previous studies in which negative
effects of stereotype threat on cognitive control have been demon-
streated before as well as after a stereotype-relevant test (Carr &
Steele, 2010; Inzlicht & Kang, 2010; Inzlicht et al., 2006; Johns et
al., 2008).
In a third and final study, we examined the consequences of
cognitive resource mobilization in response to stereotype threat for
performance on a cognitively demanding math test. To the extent
that stereotype threat (vs. control) initiates immediate recruitment
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of cognitive control resources under a prevention focus, we should
expect improved performance on a relatively short math test dis-
tributed immediately after the stereotype threat manipulation.
However, if the math test is distributed after longer exposure to the
threat, we should expect individuals under a prevention focus to
have expended a significant portion of their cognitive control
resources regulating threat-related thoughts and feelings (cf. In-
zlicht & Kang, 2010; Logel et al., 2009). As a consequence, the
classical negative stereotype threat effect should emerge under a
prevention focus, with threat (vs. control) leading to impaired math
performance.
Study 1
The purpose of Study 1 was to examine whether stereotype
threat (vs. control) immediately facilitates cognitive control while
working on a stereotype-related test.
Method
Participants and design. Sixty-three social science students
at Leiden University, the Netherlands (50 women, 13 men, Mage
22 years) were randomly assigned to a stereotype threat condition
or to a control condition. The study lasted approximately 20 min,
and participants received €2 (about $3 U.S.) or course credits for
their time in the laboratory.
Procedure. Participants were seated in separate cubicles, and
computers were used to present all stimulus materials as well as to
collect the data. First, participants were asked to answer some
background questions. Specifically, we assessed their gender, age,
and their study major. The main purpose of asking them to indicate
what subject they were studying was to make the stereotype threat
manipulation credible (see below). After this, participants were
informed that the study focused on understanding individual dif-
ferences in performance on complex cognitive tasks. In particular,
it was stated that we were interested in individual differences in
controlled information-processing capacity—an important predic-
tor of cognitive performance. This was followed by the stereotype
threat manipulation. In the stereotype threat condition, participants
were told that, aside from establishing individual differences in
controlled information-processing capacity, previous research also
suggests that social science students perform worse than students
of the exact sciences on these types of tasks. It was stated that there
was also an interest in the present research in looking into these
group-based differences in more detail. Participants in the control
condition did not receive any information about the relative per-
formance of social (vs. exact) science students. All participants
were then informed that, in order to examine these issues, they
were going to take part in a task that assessed their controlled
information-processing capacity.
Participants’ current cognitive control capacity was measured
using a simplified Stroop color-naming task suitable when re-
sponses are made using a computer keyboard (Jostmann & Koole,
2007). Participants were presented with strings of colored letters.
Some of the strings were presented in red ink and others in blue
ink. Letter strings were either a color word (the word blue or red)
or a series of Xs. The task was to ignore the meaning of the letter
string and simply focus on the color of the ink. If the ink was red,
participants were to press the A key on the keyboard. If the ink was
blue, participants were to press the 6 key on the numeric pad of the
keyboard. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and as
accurately as possible. The stimuli were presented in the center of
a white screen (Arial font, size 36). Each trial was preceded by the
presentation of a fixation asterisk for 1 s, followed by the presen-
tation of a colored letter string. After the participant had re-
sponded, the screen was blank for 2 s before the fixation asterisk
appeared again to prepare for the next trial. Before the real test,
participants received six practice trials with feedback (i.e., correct
vs. incorrect) after each trial. After that, they proceeded to the
actual Stroop test. The Stroop task consisted of 60 trials in total.
Trials were presented in randomized order, with 20 congruent
trials (red in red ink or blue in blue ink), 20 neutral trials (XXXX
in red or blue ink), and 20 incongruent trials (red in blue ink or
blue in red ink).
Participants were thanked, fully debriefed, and paid for their
time in the laboratory.
Results
Cognitive control capacity. Before analyzing the Stroop
data, erroneous responses were removed, as were responses faster
than 300 ms (cf. Jostmann & Koole, 2007). We performed anal-
yses on log-transformed response times. However, the means are
reported in untransformed response times (milliseconds) to facil-
itate comprehension of the results. First, as expected, repeated
measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) showed that responses
were slower on incongruent trials (M  542) than on neutral trials
(M  481), F(1, 62)  19.53, p  .001, p2  .24, as well as than
on congruent trials (M  477), F(1, 62)  28.61, p  .001, p2 
.32. No difference was found between congruent and neutral trials
(F  1). Thus, incongruent trials caused interference as compared
with congruent and neutral trials. Next, we computed interference
scores by subtracting average response time on congruent trials
from average response time on incongruent trials. Lower scores on
this measure therefore indicate higher cognitive control capacity.
As expected, stereotype threat had a significant effect on Stroop
interference, F(1, 61)  8.69, p  .004, p2  .13. In line with our
hypothesis, Stroop interference was lower in the stereotype threat
condition (M  24.0, SD  53.63) than in the control condition
(M  103.03, SD  133.74) (see Figure 1). To ensure that this
effect was not due to a speed–accuracy trade-off, we also exam-
ined Stroop interference on the basis of errors. For each individual,
we calculated an error interference score by subtracting the num-
ber of errors on congruent trials from the number of errors on
incongruent trials. Stereotype threat had no effect on interference
Figure 1. Stroop interference as a function of stereotype threat (Study 1).
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based on errors (F  1). Moreover, the effect on Stroop interfer-
ence based on response times remained unchanged when control-
ling for interference based on errors, F(1, 60)  8.55, p  .005,
p
2  .13. Thus, these findings were not due to a speed–accuracy
trade-off. Rather, stereotype threat reduced Stroop interference
compared with the control condition, indicating that stereotype
threat facilitated cognitive control.
Discussion
Stereotype threat facilitated cognitive control during the
stereotype-related test compared with a control condition, provid-
ing initial support for the resource recruitment hypothesis. How-
ever, we have yet to demonstrate that the prevention focus was
responsible for the effect obtained. So far, our results rely on
previous evidence that stereotype threat induces a prevention focus
(Seibt & Förster, 2004). To directly test the presumed underlying
process, we conducted a second study in which stereotype threat as
well as regulatory focus were experimentally manipulated. We
expected that stereotype threat (vs. control) should facilitate cog-
nitive control as a default (as in Study 1) as well as when a
prevention focus had been experimentally induced but that this
effect should disappear when a promotion focus had been exper-
imentally induced. Moreover, we expected prevention focus to
facilitate cognitive control under stereotype threat, but not in the
control condition.
Study 2
Method
Participants and design. One hundred eight social science
students at Leiden University (82 women, 26 men, Mage  19
years) were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (stereotype
threat: threat/control)  3 (regulatory focus: prevention focus/
promotion focus/no focus) factorial design. The study lasted ap-
proximately 20 min, and participants received €2 (about $3 U.S.)
or course credits for their time in the laboratory.
Procedure. The cover story including the stereotype threat
manipulation was the same as in Study 1. Before taking the Stroop
test, however, participants in the promotion and prevention focus
conditions were asked to first participate in a short pilot study. In
reality, this constituted the manipulation of regulatory focus. Par-
ticipants in the condition in which no regulatory focus was exper-
imentally induced did not participate in this pilot study. Partici-
pants in the prevention focus condition were asked to write down
what they thought they ought to achieve in their studies. By
contrast, participants in the promotion focus condition were asked
to write down what they would ideally want to achieve in their
studies (cf. Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994; Zaal et al.,
2011). After that, participants were informed that they would take
the test that assessed their controlled information-processing ca-
pacity. All participants then carried out the same Stroop task as in
Study 1. Upon completion of the Stroop task, the stereotype threat
manipulation was checked by asking participants to indicate on a
7-point scale their agreement with the statement “I was afraid that,
if I performed badly, people would infer that it was due to my
studies” (1  not at all, 7  very much). Finally, all participants
were thanked, fully debriefed, and paid for their time in the
laboratory.
Results
Stereotypic concerns. A 2 (stereotype threat) 3 (regulatory
focus) ANOVA yielded only a main effect of stereotype threat,
F(1, 102)  8.91, p  .004, p2  .08. Participants were more
concerned that a negative performance would lead others to infer
that it was due to their social science studies in the threat condition
(M  2.51, SD  1.71) than in the control condition (M  1.68,
SD  1.16). No other effects approached significance (Fs  1).
Cognitive control capacity. Interference scores were pre-
pared in the same way as in Study 1. A 2 (stereotype threat)  3
(regulatory focus) ANOVA on Stroop interference scores yielded
only the predicted interaction effect, F(2, 101)  3.07, p  .05,
p
2  .06. The interaction is depicted in Figure 2. Replicating the
results of Study 1, stereotype threat tended to facilitate cognitive
control when no regulatory focus had been experimentally in-
duced, F(1, 101)  2.80, p  .10, p2  .03. As predicted,
stereotype threat (vs. control) also tended to facilitate cognitive
control in the prevention condition, F(1, 101)  3.60, p  .06,
p
2  .03. By contrast, stereotype threat had no effect on cognitive
control in the promotion focus condition, F(1, 101)  1.36, p 
.24, p2  .01. The alternative set of simple main effect analyses
confirmed that the effect of regulatory focus was significant in the
stereotype threat condition, F(2, 101)  4.39, p  .02, p2  .08,
but not in the control condition (F  1). As a final step, we then
contrasted the stereotype threat condition in which a prevention
focus had been induced and the stereotype threat condition in
which no regulatory focus had been induced against the other four
conditions (contrast: 2 2 1 1 1 1). This contrast was highly
significant, t(101)  3.10, p  .002. Thus, strong support was
obtained for our predictions.1
Discussion
The main goal of Study 2 was to examine whether the preven-
tion focus was responsible for the improvements in cognitive
control capacity under stereotype threat that we observed in Study
1. Importantly, the results confirmed that stereotype threat facili-
tates cognitive control when no focus has been experimentally
induced as well as when a prevention focus has been induced, but
not when a promotion focus has been induced. The fact that
responses to stereotype threat were virtually identical in the con-
dition in which no regulatory focus had been induced and in the
prevention focus condition corroborates previous findings suggest-
ing that stereotype threat generally induces a prevention focus
(Seibt & Förster, 2004). Moreover, the present data provide direct
evidence that regulatory focus has a causal effect on cognitive
control under stereotype threat. Inducing a prevention (vs. promo-
tion) focus significantly improved cognitive control under stereo-
1 We also analyzed Stroop interference based on errors. As was the case
in Study 1, no effects emerged (all ps  .28). Moreover, the Stereotype
Threat  Regulatory Focus interaction on Stroop interference (based on
response times) remained significant when controlling for interference
based on errors, F(2, 100)  3.22, p  .04, p2  .06. Thus, the findings
were not due to a speed–accuracy trade-off.
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type threat. By contrast, inducing a prevention (vs. promotion)
focus had no effect on cognitive control in the control condition.
This demonstrates that a prevention focus does not facilitate cog-
nitive control across the board, but only in the presence of a salient
threat of failure.
Thus far, we have focused on demonstrating that stereotype
threat initiates recruitment of cognitive control resources under a
prevention focus. However, it is as yet unclear what the implica-
tions are of this response for performance on a stereotype-relevant
task that relies heavily on the central executive, such as a math test
(Beilock et al., 2007; Schmader & Johns, 2003). We argue that,
because it initiates immediate recruitment of cognitive control
resources, stereotype threat should facilitate math performance in
the short run under a prevention focus. However, because cogni-
tive control resources are highly limited (Muraven & Baumeister,
2000), regulating stereotype-related thoughts and feelings should
rather quickly lead to a state of cognitive exhaustion (e.g., Johns et
al., 2008; Logel et al., 2009). As a consequence, we expect
stereotype threat to improve performance on a math test under a
prevention focus, but not under a promotion focus, when the test is
administered immediately after the manipulations. However, we
expect individuals under a prevention focus to display the classical
stereotype threat effect on the same math test when it is adminis-
tered after a filler task allegedly related to math performance,
because the longer exposure to the threat should have depleted
their cognitive control resources. We examined these hypotheses
in a third study.
Study 3
To examine the consequences of experiencing stereotype threat
under a prevention focus for math performance over time, we had
half the (female) sample complete a short math test immediately
following the manipulations of stereotype threat and regulatory
focus, and the other half after a delay. Due to their immediate
recruitment of cognitive control resources, we expected individu-
als in the prevention focus condition to improve their math per-
formance under stereotype threat (vs. control) on the immediate
math task. After the math task, these participants completed a filler
task that served to extend exposure to the threat in the other
condition (see below).
To examine the implications of stereotype threat under a pre-
vention focus over a longer period of time, we let the other half of
the sample carry out a filler task prior to completing the math task.
To ensure that participants remained threatened while working on
the filler task, participants in the stereotype threat (vs. control)
condition were informed that the task assessed automatic cognitive
processes thought to contribute to math performance (vs. working
memory). We reasoned that participants in the stereotype threat
condition should spend considerable cognitive control resources
regulating or suppressing stereotype-related thoughts and feelings
while working on the filler task (Logel et al., 2009). We therefore
expected that being exposed to stereotype threat during the filler
task prior to the math task should be sufficient to deplete cognitive
control resources among individuals under a prevention focus. We
opted for a typing task as a filler task because typing does not rely
heavily on executive control (e.g., Rieger, 2004). Varying the
order in which participants completed the math task therefore
allowed us to examine whether our effect was indeed restricted to
tasks that rely heavily on executive control. Specifically, because
the math task relies on executive control, we expected different
interaction effects between stereotype threat and regulatory focus
to emerge on math performance depending on whether the task
was completed before the filler task (then threat should facilitate
performance under a prevention focus) or after the filler task (then
threat should impair performance under a prevention focus). Be-
cause the filler task does not rely on executive control resources,
we did not expect any effects of our experimental manipulations
on performance on this task, irrespective of task order. Finally,
consistent with Study 2, as well as previous research (Keller &
Bless, 2008), we expected no effects of stereotype threat on math
performance in the promotion focus condition.
Method
Participants and design. One hundred sixty-four female
students (Mage 19) at Leiden University were randomly assigned
to conditions in a 2 (stereotype threat: threat/control)  2 (regu-
latory focus: promotion/prevention)  2 (task order: math task
first/math task last) factorial design.
Procedure. Upon arrival to the lab, participants were led to
separate cubicles containing a computer. All instructions were
presented on the computer screen. First, participants were asked to
participate in a short typing task to get a baseline assessment of
their typing skills (speed and accuracy). Then the cover story
containing the stereotype threat manipulation was introduced. Par-
ticipants in the stereotype threat (vs. control) condition were in-
formed that the study focused on understanding differences in
mathematical ability (vs. working memory capacity). In particular,
it was explained, the study focused on how certain cognitive
processes contribute to mathematical capacity (vs. working mem-
ory capacity). Therefore, it was stated, participants would take part
in two tests: a test of automatic cognitive processes thought to be
relevant for math performance (vs. working memory) and a direct
test of their mathematical ability (vs. working memory). This
cover story was used to ensure that participants in the stereotype
threat condition thought of both tasks as relevant to math ability
and thereby ensuring that they remained in a state of stereotype
threat throughout the experiment. To further strengthen the stereo-
type threat manipulation, participants in the threat condition were
also informed that one of the goals of the studies was to examine
gender differences in mathematical ability and its underlying pro-
cesses. No information about gender differences was presented to
participants in the control condition.
Figure 2. Stroop interference as a function of stereotype threat and
regulatory focus (Study 2).
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Participants were then told that, before taking on the different
tasks, they would participate in a short pilot study. They were
instructed to turn over a piece of paper found next to the
computer and to follow instructions. The piece of paper con-
tained the regulatory focus manipulation in the form of a maze
task (Friedman & Förster, 2001). In the prevention condition, a
mouse was depicted in the middle of a maze, and a predator bird
was depicted hovering above it. The instruction was to use their
pencil to lead the mouse to the safety of its home outside the
maze. In the promotion condition, the predator bird was re-
placed by a piece of cheese lying outside of the maze, and the
instruction was to use their pencil to lead the mouse to the
cheese.
Upon completion of the regulatory focus manipulation, partic-
ipants were informed that they would now start taking the tests.
Depending on task order condition, participants either completed
the math task followed by the typing task, or the other way around.
Math performance was assessed by means of a modular arithmetic
task. We opted for this measure for two different reasons. First of
all, modular arithmetic has previously been linked to working
memory capacity (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2005). Thus, performance
on this task should be highly sensitive to fluctuations in executive
function. Second, modular arithmetic should not require the flex-
ible, creative processing style associated with being in a promotion
focus. Therefore, measuring math performance by means of a
modular arithmetic task should reduce the risk that our predicted
effects were cancelled out by creativity-related processes fre-
quently involved in solving cognitively demanding math problems
(Seibt & Förster, 2004).
Participants were asked to assess the validity (true or false) of
modular arithmetic problems such as “36 ' 18 (Mod 4).” To
solve this problem, the middle number is subtracted from the
first number (i.e., 34 – 18), after which the difference is divided
by the last number (i.e., 16  4). The problem is considered true
only if the division results in a whole number. To ensure that
the task was sufficiently cognitively demanding, problems al-
ways contained a borrowing operation, and all numbers used
were higher than 10 (cf. Beilock & Carr, 2005; Beilock et al.,
2007). Before the test, participants carried out three practice
trials. The actual test consisted of a total of 20 modular arith-
metic problems of which 50 % were “true.” Participants were
instructed to solve each problem as quickly and as accurately as
possible by indicating whether the problem was true or false.
Consistent with previous research on stereotype threat effects
on math performance, the primary interest was in the percentage
of correct responses on the test. However, to ensure that any
effects obtained were not due to a speed–accuracy trade-off,
response times were also examined.
The typing task was identical to the one used to measure their
baseline typing skills, except that it lasted for 4 min rather than for
1 min. Participants spent 4 min typing words presented on the
screen as quickly and as accurately as possible. The words were
presented on the screen one at a time to ensure that participants did
not spend cognitive control resources maintaining strings of words
in working memory. Typing performance was measured both by
the number of words typed as well as the number of typing
mistakes made.
Results
Math performance (percentage of correct responses). Be-
fore analyzing the data, we removed six outliers (scoring more
than 3 SD from the mean). After that we performed a 2 (stereotype
threat)  2 (regulatory focus)  2 (task order) ANOVA on the
percentage of correctly solved math equations. This analysis re-
vealed a Regulatory Focus  Task Order interaction, F(1, 150) 
5.56, p  .02, p2  .04, qualified by the predicted three-way
interaction, F(1, 150)  13.30, p  .001, p2  .08.
In order to break down the significant three-way interaction, we
examined the Stereotype Threat  Regulatory Focus interaction
within each task order condition. As illustrated in Figure 3, these
analyses revealed that the interaction was significant when the
math task was presented first, F(1, 150)  9.15, p  .003, p2 
.06. In this condition, individuals in the prevention focus condition
performed better under stereotype threat (M  95%, SD  0.06)
than in the control condition (M  87%, SD  0.08), t(150) 
3.02, p  .003. By contrast, in the promotion focus condition,
performance did not differ between the stereotype threat condition
(M  87%, SD  0.08) and the control condition (M  90%,
SD  0.07), t(150)  1.28, p  .20. Additional analyses dem-
onstrated that regulatory focus had an effect on math performance
in the stereotype threat condition, t(150)  3.06, p  .003, but not
in the control condition, t(150)  1.28, p  .20. Thus, we found
support for the notion that, in the short run, stereotype threat can
facilitate math performance when under a prevention focus.
The Stereotype Threat  Regulatory Focus interaction was
significant also when the math task was presented after the filler
task, F(1, 150)  4.32, p  .04, p2  .03. As illustrated in Figure
4, however, the opposite pattern was found. Individuals in the
prevention focus condition performed slightly worse under stereo-
type threat (M  84%, SD  0.12) than in the control condition
(M  89%, SD  0.08), t(150)  1.71, p  .09. Again, in the
promotion focus condition, performance did not differ between the
stereotype threat condition (M  92%, SD  0.07) and the control
condition (M  89%, SD  0.09), t(150)  1.26, p  .21.
Furthermore, regulatory focus once again had a significant effect
in the stereotype threat condition, t(150)  2.94, p  .004, but
not in the control condition (t  0).
Math performance (response times). We also examined
math performance in terms of speed. Examining speed of respond-
ing is important in order to show that the effect obtained on math
performance was not due to a speed–accuracy trade-off. Before
analyzing the data, we removed four outliers (more than 3 SD from
the mean). A 2 (stereotype threat) 2 (regulatory focus) 2 (task
Figure 3. Percentage of correctly solved math problems prior to the filler
task as a function of stereotype threat and regulatory focus (Study 3).
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order) ANOVA on the average response time for the 20 math items
yielded only a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 152)  4.87,
p  .03, p2  .03. As can be seen in Table 1, when the math task
came first, participants in the prevention focus condition solved the
problems faster under threat (vs. control), whereas participants in
the promotion focus condition needed more time to solve the
problems under threat (vs. control). However, the Stereotype
Threat  Regulatory Focus interaction did not reach significance
in this task order condition, F(1, 152)  1.92, p  .17, p2  .01.
The opposite pattern of results was obtained when the math task
was presented after the typing task. However, the Stereotype
Threat  Regulatory Focus interaction only reached marginal
significance in this task order condition, F(1, 152) 3.11, p .08,
p
2  .02. Most important for the present purposes, these findings
clearly show that the effect obtained on the percentage of correct
responses was not due to a speed–accuracy trade-off.2
Typing performance. Because typing performance does not
rely heavily on cognitive control, we did not anticipate any effects
of stereotype threat or regulatory focus on typing performance,
irrespective of task order condition. We performed a 2 (stereotype
threat)  2 (regulatory focus)  2 (task order) analysis of cova-
riance on typing speed as well as on typing accuracy (controlling
for baseline typing speed and accuracy). Not surprisingly, baseline
typing speed was significantly associated with typing speed on the
test, and baseline typing accuracy was related to typing accuracy
on the test. However, no effects involving any of our experimental
manipulations emerged on typing speed (all Fs  1) or on typing
accuracy (all ps  .20). Most notably, the three-way interaction
did not approach significance on either of the typing performance
measures (both Fs 1). Thus, whereas task order determined how
stereotype threat and regulatory focus affected performance on the
math task that relies on cognitive control, this was not the case for
the typing task that does not rely heavily on cognitive control
(Rieger, 2004).
Discussion
This study demonstrated that stereotype threat (vs. control) can
improve performance on a math test when under a prevention
focus—provided that the math test was presented immediately
following the stereotype threat manipulation. This is consistent
with the argument that individuals respond to stereotype threat by
recruiting cognitive control resources when under a prevention
focus. When the math test was administered after a stereotype-
relevant filler task, however, individuals under a prevention focus
performed worse under stereotype threat than in the control con-
dition. This is consistent with the notion that regulating or sup-
pressing stereotype-related thoughts and feelings eventually
should lead to cognitive exhaustion. Consistent with results from
Study 2, regulatory focus affected (short-term and long-term)
performance in the stereotype threat condition, but not in the
control condition. Furthermore, performance was again unaffected
by the stereotype threat manipulation (irrespective of task order
condition) when under a promotion focus.
Notably, these results cannot be explained by different tactical
preferences for fast versus accurate responding (e.g., Seibt &
Förster, 2004; cf. Scholer, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2008; Scholer,
Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010). Instead, analyses of
response times to the math problems indicated that the effect on
processing speed was similar to that on correct responding (albeit
weaker). This suggests that the effects obtained on correct re-
sponding were attributable to differences in cognitive control
capacity rather than to tactical preferences. Finally, it should also
be noted that the manipulations had no effects at all on the
stereotype-relevant task that did not rely heavily on cognitive
control (the typing task), providing additional support for the
resource recruitment hypothesis.
General Discussion
The present research provides new insights into how stereotype
threat affects cognitive performance in general, and how these
effects are connected to prevention-oriented self-regulation in par-
ticular (cf. Keller & Bless, 2008; Seibt & Förster, 2004). Previous
work has demonstrated that stereotype threat can induce a preven-
tion focus, which in turn affects the cognitive strategies adopted in
goal pursuit (Seibt & Förster, 2004). In particular, a prevention
focus can cause the individual to prioritize accuracy at the expense
of speed and bolster analytical thinking at the expense of creativ-
ity. The fact that individuals adopt a prevention focus can therefore
help explain why stereotype threat impairs performance on cogni-
tive tasks that rely on a flexible style of information processing
(Seibt & Förster, 2004). However, this explanation is insufficient
to account for findings suggesting that stereotype threat impairs
the capacity to regulate one’s thoughts and behavior more gener-
ally (Inzlicht et al., 2006; Schmader & Johns, 2003). After all, the
ability to self-regulate should be of critical importance for
promotion-oriented as well as prevention-oriented goal pursuit.
Furthermore, because the primary purpose of the prevention focus
is to tackle threatening situations, it seems implausible that a
prevention focus should impair self-regulation under the very
circumstances it has evolved to deal with (i.e., when a threat is
present). Rather, it seems more plausible that the prevention focus
should improve self-regulation under such circumstances. Consis-
tent with this line of reasoning, other studies on regulatory focus
suggest that individuals under a prevention focus are particularly
motivated to engage in a task when the risk of failure is high (Shah
& Higgins, 1997; Zaal et al., 2011) and that they are inclined to do
so as quickly as possible (cf. Freitas et al., 2002).
2 The predicted three-way interaction on the percentage of correctly
solved math problems remained unchanged when controlling for math
performance in terms of speed, F(1, 149)  13.20, p  .001, p2  .08.
Figure 4. Percentage of correctly solved math problems after the filler
task as a function of stereotype threat and regulatory focus (Study 3).
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Building on this work, we have argued in the present article that
individuals respond to stereotype threat by adopting a prevention
focus, which in turn leads to immediate recruitment of additional
cognitive control resources in an attempt to avoid failure. This
response, we have argued, should have short-term benefits for the
individual’s cognitive control capacity and can thus be viewed as
an adaptive response to an imminent environmental threat. How-
ever, because cognitive control resources are limited, and because
stereotype threat brings additional cognitive demands to the per-
formance situation (Schmader & Johns, 2003), stereotype threat
should eventually lead to impaired cognitive performance (under a
prevention focus).
A set of studies in which we used different manipulations of
stereotype threat, as well as different manipulations of regulatory
focus, provided convergent evidence in support of this line of
reasoning. In the first study, we demonstrated the basic phenom-
enon that stereotype threat facilitates immediate cognitive control.
Study 2 provided direct experimental evidence that the prevention
focus is responsible for this effect. Specifically, stereotype threat
facilitated immediate cognitive control as a default as well as when
a prevention focus had been induced, but not when a promotion
focus had been induced. Importantly, this study also demonstrated
that a prevention focus is not beneficial for cognitive control
across the board. Rather, a prevention focus facilitated cognitive
control under stereotype threat, but not in the control condition.
Finally, in Study 3, we examined the implications of adopting a
prevention (vs. promotion) focus in response to stereotype threat
for math performance over time. Consistent with our resource
recruitment account, stereotype threat improved performance on a
math test administered immediately after the threat manipulation
under a prevention focus. As expected, however, the benefits of
adopting a prevention focus under stereotype threat proved to be
limited. When exposed to stereotype threat for a longer period of
time prior to the math task, stereotype threat (vs. control) instead
impaired math performance among individuals under a prevention
focus. Consistent with findings from Study 2, stereotype threat had
no effects on performance under a promotion focus, and regulatory
focus only affected performance under threat, and not in the
control condition. Taken together, these studies strongly suggest
that individuals respond to stereotype threat by adopting a preven-
tion focus, which in turn leads to recruitment of cognitive control
resources. Although this response has short-term benefits for cog-
nitive control exertion in threatening performance situations, it
unfortunately cannot prevent these threatening situations from
impairing cognitive performance over longer periods of time.
Consistent with the theoretical account put forth by Seibt and
Förster (2004), the present work further demonstrates that stereo-
type threat effects on cognitive performance are attributable to the
prevention focus. However, moving beyond previous work, our
findings suggest that stereotype threat does not (only) affect cog-
nitive performance because individuals adopt a careful, noncre-
ative style of cognitive processing that is unsuitable for many
cognitive tasks. If that was the case, we should have found a main
effect of regulatory focus on cognitive control and math perfor-
mance in the present studies. Specifically, to the extent that the
tasks required analytical (vs. flexible) cognitive processing, a
prevention (vs. promotion) focus should have facilitated perfor-
mance. However, our studies consistently show that adopting a
prevention focus only affected the individual’s cognitive control
capacity and math performance when there was a salient risk of
failure (i.e., under stereotype threat). These findings are consistent
with our line of reasoning that, because stereotype threat signals a
high risk of failure, it leads to recruitment of additional cognitive
control resources when under a prevention focus. When there is no
salient risk of failure (in the control condition), the prevention
focus does not lead to recruitment of cognitive control resources.
When under a promotion focus, by contrast, stereotype threat does
not lead to recruitment of cognitive control resources, because
individuals are not sensitive to the risk of failure when in a
promotion-oriented state. Rather, when under a promotion focus,
individuals are sensitive to opportunities for gains (Higgins, 1997).
As a consequence, we speculate that salient positive stereotypes
may lead to recruitment of cognitive control resources when under
a promotion focus. Such a response could potentially contribute to
(short-term) stereotype boost effects on demanding cognitive tasks
and be associated with choking-under-pressure phenomena over
time (cf. Keller & Bless, 2008).
In light of the present evidence that stereotype threat can facil-
itate immediate cognitive control and math performance, provided
that the threat induces a prevention focus, a relevant question is
why these initial cognitive benefits have not previously been
reported in the stereotype threat literature. After all, stereotype
threat studies generally do not include stereotype-relevant filler
tasks prior to the critical assessment of the individual’s cognitive
performance (as we did in Study 3). Yet, the literature consistently
shows that stereotype threat impairs cognitive performance. We
believe this, at least in part, has to do with the types of tests
generally used in the stereotype threat literature. As pointed out by
Seibt and Förster (2004), studies demonstrating stereotype threat
effects have generally used highly complex cognitive tests. Apart
Table 1
Response Time to Math Problems as a Function of Stereotype Threat, Regulatory Focus, and Task Order (Study 3)
Dependent variable Regulatory focus
Task order
Math task first Math task last
Promotion focus Prevention focus Promotion focus Prevention focus
Response time Stereotype threat
M 9.64 8.31 7.99 9.27
(SD) (2.77) (2.32) (2.42) (2.51)
Control
M 8.89 9.13 9.24 8.43
(SD) (2.60) (2.76) (2.92) (2.69)
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from sufficient cognitive control resources, successful completion
of these types of tests generally requires creative thinking, the
ability to generate various alternative solutions, and the flexibility
to shift from one problem-solving strategy to another. Notably,
such creative and flexible cognition is associated with the promo-
tion focus rather than the prevention focus (Crowe & Higgins,
1997; Friedman & Förster, 2001, 2002; Liberman, Molden, Idson,
& Higgins, 2001). As a result, the initial cognitive benefits of
adopting a prevention focus in response to stereotype threat may
frequently be cancelled out by the absence of creative processes
required to solve these complex problems. In the present research,
by contrast, we selected a modular arithmetic task to measure math
performance precisely because it should not rely on creative
thought, while it remains sensitive to fluctuations in working
memory capacity (Beilock & Carr, 2005). Thus, the modular
arithmetic task used in the present research was highly suitable to
pick up on subtle changes in executive control.
Related to this, there are some prior studies in which stereotype
threat has been related to performance on tasks requiring cognitive
control (Carr & Steele, 2010; Inzlicht & Kang, 2010; Inzlicht et al.,
2006; Johns et al., 2008). These studies have revealed that stereo-
type threat can lead to suboptimal cognitive control on tasks that
are completed in anticipation of the stereotype-relevant task, or on
tasks that follow up on stereotype-relevant tasks. As we have
explained in the introduction, this might well indicate conservation
of cognitive resources in anticipation of the stereotype-relevant
task and cognitive depletion following performance on the
stereotype-relevant task. It does not directly speak to our predic-
tion that stereotype threat induces a prevention focus, which leads
individuals to recruit additional cognitive control resources while
working on the stereotype-relevant test.
Ruling out Alternative Explanations
Although we believe that the present findings provide strong
support for our resource recruitment account, there are two possi-
ble alternative explanations for our findings that have yet to be
considered and that we discuss here in some detail. First, there is
the regulatory fit account of stereotype threat put forth by Grimm
and her colleagues (Grimm, Markman, Maddox, & Baldwin,
2009). The principle of regulatory fit states that performance
benefits from a match between one’s regulatory focus and the way
in which one is pursuing a goal (Higgins, 2000, 2005). Individuals
with a promotion focus experience regulatory fit when working on
a task that is framed in terms of possible gains (e.g., when correct
responses are rewarded), whereas individuals with a prevention
focus experience regulatory fit when working on a task that is
framed in terms of avoiding losses (e.g., when mistakes are pun-
ished). Consistent with the principle of regulatory fit, it has been
demonstrated that making a negative stereotype salient (and
thereby inducing a prevention focus) impairs performance when
the task has an explicit or implicit gain frame. By contrast, making
a negative stereotype salient can improve performance when the
task has an explicit or implicit loss frame (Grimm et al., 2009).
Could the principle of regulatory fit account for the present
findings? For several reasons, we do not believe this is the case.
First of all, the task instructions in these studies did not include any
explicit reference to rewards or punishments. Rather, we merely
instructed participants to respond as quickly and as accurately as
possible. Furthermore, even if we assume that the instructions
somehow resulted in an implicit loss frame, the findings from
Study 2 and Study 3 are inconsistent with a regulatory fit account.
Specifically, if regulatory fit was responsible for our findings, we
should have obtained a main effect of experimentally induced
regulatory focus on performance in these studies, not a Regulatory
Rocus  Stereotype Threat interaction. After all, regulatory focus
was induced after the stereotype threat manipulation in these
studies and should thus cancel out the prevention focus induced by
the stereotype threat manipulation. However, regulatory focus was
unrelated to performance in the control condition. This clearly
demonstrates that task instructions did not generate regulatory fit
under a prevention focus, or a regulatory mismatch under a pro-
motion focus. Instead, a prevention focus only facilitated imme-
diate performance under stereotype threat. This pattern of findings
is not consistent with a regulatory fit account, but provides strong
support for the resource recruitment hypothesis.
Second, to the extent that task instructions fit a prevention focus,
any evidence of impaired performance in the prevention focus
condition would speak against a regulatory fit interpretation. No-
tably, we demonstrated that a prevention focus could improve as
well as impair performance on the very same math test under
stereotype threat, merely as a function of task order (while task
instructions remained the same). Meanwhile, performance on the
math task was unaffected by stereotype threat as well as task order
in the promotion focus condition.
Finally, regulatory fit theory states that regulatory fit has a
positive effect on task enjoyment (e.g., Freitas & Higgins, 2002;
Freitas, Liberman, & Higgins, 2002). Notably, we included an item
measuring task enjoyment in Study 2. None of the manipulations
had an effect on enjoyment of the Stroop task (all ps  .18).
Indeed, the Regulatory Focus  Stereotype Threat interaction on
cognitive control remained significant when controlling for differ-
ences in task enjoyment (p  .05). Taken together, we are there-
fore convinced that regulatory fit cannot account for the present
findings.
A second possible alternative explanation for the findings that
should be considered is the “mere effort” account put forth by
Jamieson and Harkins (2007). According to Jamieson and Harkins,
stereotype threat increases effort, which in turn potentiates prepo-
tent responses and intensifies attempts to correct initial mistakes.
This generally leads to impaired performance on complex tasks,
but to improved performance on simple tasks. Can a mere effort
account for the present findings? Again, we do not believe this is
the case. First of all, the fact that stereotype threat reduced Stroop
interference suggests that it had the very opposite effect than that
suggested by Jamieson and Harkins. Stereotype threat facilitated
inhibition of the prepotent response, rather than potentiating the
prepotent response. However, Harkins and colleagues have also
argued that mere effort can reduce Stroop interference, provided
that the response window is not too short (McFall, Jamieson, &
Harkins, 2009). Because we did not use a short response window
in the present studies, the results from the first two studies could
be interpreted as consistent with a mere effort account.
However, the findings from the third study cannot be explained
in terms of mere effort. In particular, if mere effort was driving
these effects, why were no effects obtained on the stereotype-
related filler task? After all, typing is easy and does not require
inhibition of a prepotent response. Typing speed and accuracy
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should therefore be highly sensitive to variations in effort. Never-
theless, the effects on performance were isolated to the math test
in Study 3. This pattern of results is not consistent with a mere
effort account. However, it is highly consistent with the resource
recruitment hypothesis, because typing does not rely on executive
control resources, whereas performance on the modular arithmetic
test does (Beilock & Carr, 2005; Beilock et al., 2007). Related to
this, a mere effort account does little in explaining why the effect
of stereotype threat on math performance suddenly reversed after
the filler task, whereas task order had no effect on performance on
the typing task. Again, this pattern of results is consistent with the
notion that exposure to stereotype threat taxes limited cognitive
control resources. Being exposed to stereotype threat over a longer
period of time should eventually impair performance on a math
test that relies on control, but not on a typing task that does not rely
on control. In conclusion, the resource recruitment hypothesis is
the only explanation that can account for all of the findings from
the present research.
Concluding Remarks
Previous research has demonstrated that stereotype threat can
affect performance on demanding cognitive tasks by inducing a
prevention focus as well as by impairing central executive func-
tions. The present research provided evidence that these two con-
sequences of stereotype threat are related. Individuals who expe-
rience stereotype threat adopt a prevention focus and consequently
mobilize their cognitive control resources in an attempt to avoid
failure. Stereotype threat therefore facilitates cognitive control in
the short run, which implies that the spontaneous tendency to adopt
a prevention focus under stereotype threat can be viewed as an
adaptive response to an imminent environmental threat. Due to the
limited capacity of the central executive, however, this response
cannot prevent stereotype threat from impairing cognitive perfor-
mance over time.
The primary contribution of the present work is clearly that it
demonstrates the direct link between self-regulation accounts
(Seibt & Förster, 2004) and limited resource accounts (e.g., In-
zlicht & Kang, 2010; Schmader & Johns, 2003) of stereotype
threat. However, the present findings also have some practical
implications for how to reduce stereotype threat effects in test
situations. Seibt and Förster (2004) suggested that more relaxed
time constraints in test situations may make the tests more fair,
because it would enable threatened individuals to take full advan-
tage of their careful, prevention-oriented strategies. Although we
acknowledge this possibility, the present research suggests that
more relaxed time constraints could at best offer an incomplete
solution to problems associated with stereotype threat. Although
this solution may help to reduce stereotype threat effects that are
attributable to slow, careful strategies, it is unlikely to reduce
effects that are due to cognitive exhaustion. In fact, it may even
exacerbate such effects.
In light of this, we believe a more promising avenue is to
develop interventions that effectively reduce the threat experi-
enced in the test situation. The literature points to several ways in
which this goal can be achieved. For example, merely teaching
individuals subject to threat about the stereotype threat phenome-
non can enable them to attribute their anxiety to external causes,
which has proved sufficient to eradicate effects on performance
(Johns, Schmader, & Martens, 2005; cf. Stone et al., 1999). Ste-
reotype threat effects have also been alleviated by introducing a
simple self-affirmation exercise prior to taking the test (Cohen,
Garcia, Apfel, & Master, 2006; Martens, Johns, Greenberg, &
Schimel, 2006). On the basis of the present research, yet another
way to reduce the threat in test situations could be to develop
interventions that induce a promotion focus prior to taking the test.
Although individuals subject to threat would not reap the initial
cognitive benefits associated with adopting a prevention focus, this
type of intervention should reduce the level of threat they experi-
ence (cf. Keller & Bless, 2008) and decrease the likelihood that the
test situation depletes their cognitive resources over time.
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